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NOTES 
(BEYOND) FAMILY TIES:  
REMOTE TIPPEES IN A POST-SALMAN ERA 
Austin J. Green* 
 
In Salman v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Dirks v. 
SEC, holding that a personal benefit may be inferred where an insider 
discloses material nonpublic information to a “trading relative or friend.”  
While the decision was viewed as a win for prosecutors, the Court’s limited 
holding did little to address issues pertaining to more complex tipping 
chains, such as those raised by the Second Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Newman two years prior.  Particularly, a remote tippee cannot 
always determine whether material nonpublic information was improperly 
disclosed at the time of receipt.  Such a remote tippee could not know 
whether trading on the tip is lawful without further investigation, and in the 
fast-paced securities industry, time is money.  These scenarios also raise 
issues in the courtroom, where prosecutors must prove that the remote 
tippee knew, or should have known, the information was improperly 
disclosed at time of the trade, and the Supreme Court has rejected the 
notion that a remote tippee presumptively knows that material nonpublic 
information was improperly disclosed.  In response to these lingering 
uncertainties, this Note proposes that the SEC adopt Rule 10b5-D, a safe 
harbor rule that would encourage disclosure and promote timely decision 
making without condoning insider trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An analyst and a hedge fund manager walk into a bar.  The analyst tells 
the manager that she heard X Corp stock is about to plunge.  When asked 
about where this information originated, the analyst merely states that she 
received the tip from an old college friend but does not know how her 
friend obtained the information.  If the manager then sells the fund’s X 
Corp stock holdings, will she be liable for insider trading?1  Will she go to 
jail?  It depends. 
The manager knows that whether she may lawfully trade on the analyst’s 
tip depends on whether the information was originally disclosed in breach 
of a fiduciary duty.2  Absent a breach, the manager is free to trade.3  
Regardless, the manager cannot know whether trading on the analyst’s tip 
would be lawful without knowing more.4  Time spent investigating the facts 
pertaining to the source of the information could be costly, however, as the 
information’s value will decrease over time.5  However, placing the trade 
 
 1. “‘Insider trading’ is a term of art that refers to unlawful trading in securities by 
persons who possess material nonpublic information about the company whose shares are 
traded or the market for its shares.” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING:  
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 1:1 (2016). 
 2. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655–66 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646, 662–64 (1983). 
 3. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10, at 4-34 n.3 (“[I]t 
is necessary that the notice of the breach (i.e., intent to benefit) relate back to the insider in 
order to create abstain or disclose liability.”). 
 4. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the premise that a tipper who discloses 
material nonpublic information necessarily does so for a personal benefit. See Dirks, 463 
U.S. at 661–62. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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without performing a sufficient investigation could result in a court finding 
that she consciously avoided learning about the potential breach.6  The 
manager is thus presented with a dilemma:  either she abstains from trading 
with the chance of forgoing permissible profits, or she trades at the risk of 
facing criminal prosecution.7 
This manager’s dilemma illustrates the problem with the current insider 
trading laws, particularly as applied to “remote tippees.”8  A remote tippee 
commits insider trading when she purchases or sells securities on the basis 
of material nonpublic information that she knows, or reasonably should 
know, was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information.9  A breach occurs where the information was originally 
disclosed in exchange for a personal benefit,10 which, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court recently held in Salman v. United States,11 may be inferred where the 
tipper discloses the information to a “trading relative or friend,” even where 
nothing tangible or of pecuniary value is received in return.12 
Salman was the Supreme Court’s first insider trading case in almost two 
decades, but it did little to address recent issues within insider trading 
jurisprudence.  Almost exactly two years before the Supreme Court decided 
Salman, the Second Circuit created waves when it handed down its decision 
in United States v. Newman.13  In that case, the Second Circuit made two 
distinctions from the Supreme Court’s landmark case, United States v. 
Dirks.14  First, the court found that “the mere fact of a friendship, 
particularly of a casual or social nature,” was insufficient to draw the 
inference of a personal benefit to the tipper.15  Second, the court held that a 
 
 6. Even in a criminal case, the government contends that the requisite knowledge 
element may be satisfied if the court finds that the manager “consciously avoided” learning 
of the breach. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
420 (2016) (No. 15-628).  While the petition for writ of certiorari presented the question of 
whether failure to investigate suspicious circumstances alone can satisfy the knowledge 
requirement, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628), the 
Supreme Court declined to review that issue, see Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 
(2016). 
 7. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 218 
(2006) (“From the standpoint of the would-be trader who is several degrees removed from 
the source of information, this leads to the remote tippee’s dilemma—whether to trade and 
risk the possibility that the original source, or primary tipper, breached a duty, or whether to 
refrain from trading and risk foregoing a profit or avoiding a loss in a transaction that would 
have been legal.”). 
 8. A “remote tippee” is an actor who receives material nonpublic information 
indirectly. Id. at 184 n.18. 
 9. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
555–66 (1997) (endorsing the misappropriation theory as a basis for establishing liability in 
insider trading cases). 
 10. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. 
 11. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 12. Id. at 428–29 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 
(2016) (providing a nonexhaustive list of relationships where the inference of a personal 
benefit to the tipper may be drawn). 
 13. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 14. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 15. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
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remote tippee’s knowledge cannot be inferred “where the financial 
information is of a nature regularly and accurately predicted by analyst 
modeling.”16  The Supreme Court did not discuss these aspects of Newman 
in its recent opinion.17  Thus, the legal significance of the distinctions 
identified by the Second Circuit may continue to carry weight in future 
cases.18 
The minute distinctions identified in Newman may perpetuate the 
uncertainties faced by investors who seek to trade in accordance with the 
law.19  Similarly, prosecutors may find it more difficult to establish the 
knowledge requirement in cases against remote tippees, and that difficulty 
will only increase when the remote tippee is further removed from the 
tipper.20  This will burden the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in particular, which must already be selective in choosing cases for its 
Enforcement Division to target.21  Additionally, lower courts may find it 
difficult to consistently distinguish between types of relationships and 
information where the inference of a personal benefit may be drawn.  This 
may exacerbate some courts’ tendency to implicitly enforce a fairness-
based regime22—a practice that directly contravenes explicit Supreme 
Court precedent.23 
 
 16. Id. at 455. 
 17. See generally Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420.  With regard to Newman, the Court simply 
stated, “To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of 
a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we 
agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.” Id. at 428 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 18. The weight of Newman is reinforced by the Second Circuit’s significant influence on 
securities law. See Karen Patton Seymour, Securities and Financial Regulation in the Second 
Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (2016) (noting that the Second Circuit has decided 
one-third of securities decisions decided by appellate courts). 
 19. “[T]he remote tippee’s apparent duty to inquire is further complicated by the 
necessity of determining when information is sufficiently specific and accurate so as to be 
material and raise suspicions that it emanated from a tainted source, not from general 
market-place rumors.” Coles, supra note 7, at 216. 
 20. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10 (noting that establishing “sufficient 
knowledge of the insider’s personal benefit becomes considerably more difficult—especially 
in the criminal context—as the chain of tippees lengthens”); Coles, supra note 7, at 219 
n.232 (“As the information moves down the chain of tippees . . . the evidence of a close 
relationship with the primary tipper typically attenuates and then disappears from the mix of 
circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[O]ne can imagine cases where a remote tippee’s knowledge that the 
tipper was receiving some sort of benefit might be difficult to prove.”). 
 21. “The typical insider trader is never caught or prosecuted, for the costs in manpower 
and resources of investigation and litigation are extremely high in this area.” 18 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:13 (noting that formal investigations were actually initiated 
in only 203 out of 83,000 business events in 1985 and 1986 where the possibility of insider 
trading was present). 
 22. Coles, supra note 7, at 208, 211 (noting that lower courts have tended to interpret the 
personal benefit requirement expansively and “ease[] the standards for both pleading and 
proving that the primary tipper relayed nonpublic information to a primary tippee for 
personal gain” (footnotes omitted)). 
 23. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the fairness-based approach. See, e.g., 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 
n.16 (1980).  Nevertheless, the government continues to push for the Supreme Court to 
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Despite recent developments, compliance with the insider trading laws 
remains difficult and unpredictable.24  While some have argued that the 
remote tippee’s dilemma is easily resolved under a fairness-based 
approach,25 such a rule would be inconsistent with congressional intent and 
Supreme Court precedent.26  Alternatively, this Note proposes a solution to 
alleviate the uncertainties regarding remote tippees where it is not readily 
apparent whether the inference of a personal benefit to the tipper may be 
drawn.  Part I analyzes the evolution of insider trading jurisprudence.  Then, 
Part II addresses the arguments for and against the insider trading 
prohibition as well as various tests and approaches under which remote 
tippees may be held liable.  Finally, Part III proposes the adoption of Rule 
10b5-D, a safe harbor disclosure rule that encourages disclosure and 
promotes timely decision making without condoning or encouraging insider 
trading or requiring any substantive changes in existing law.27 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF INSIDER TRADING 
The basis for insider trading liability is rooted in section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”).  Section 10(b) 
prohibits the use of fraudulent or manipulative devices used “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security” and gives the SEC broad 
authority to define practices that constitute such devices.28  Since the 
Exchange Act’s enactment, the rules governing liability have been crafted 
and refined by the SEC and federal courts to conform the act of insider 
trading to section 10(b)’s fraud-prevention mandate.29 
Insider trading is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Exchange 
Act30 nor was it a practice that concerned Congress in 1934.31  To better 
understand the distinction between lawful and unlawful trading on material 
nonpublic information, it is helpful to understand how insider trading 
compares to the practices that warranted reform.  Part I.A discusses harmful 
 
endorse a fairness-based approach. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–27, Salman v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628). 
 24. See Coles, supra note 7, at 184; Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between 
Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading:  Why a Property Rights 
Theory of Insider Trading Information Is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 151 (1993). 
 25. See Coles, supra note 7, at 235–36 (suggesting that a fairness-based approach would 
be easiest for average investors to comply with). 
 26. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657–63. 
 27. At least one other law review article has proposed the adoption of a safe harbor rule, 
though with a more limited scope. See Bernard Tsepelman, A Safe Harbor for 
Communicating or Trading on Material Nonpublic Information Obtained Through 
“Replicable” Methods or Strategies:  Proposed SEC Rule 10b5-SH, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 
353 (2015). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).  For further discussion on section 10(b), see infra notes 81–
89. 
 29. See infra Part I.B–D. 
 30. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING 25–27 (2d ed. 2007); see also Anna 
Currier, Comment, The Rule of Lenity and the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 5 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 79, 92 (2015). 
 31. Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 
343, 344 (1999). 
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practices in the securities industry that were prevalent in the years prior to 
the Great Depression.  Part I.B then reviews the evolution of insider trading 
jurisprudence within the courts to show the development of the current rule 
governing remote tippee liability.  Next, Part I.C highlights attempts by 
Congress and the SEC to reinforce the insider trading prohibition after 
Dirks.  Finally, Part I.D analyzes the Second Circuit’s opinion in Newman 
and compares that to the Supreme Court’s recent Salman case. 
A.  The Boiling Pot 
Congress enacted the Exchange Act, in part, to prevent a recurrence of 
the Great Depression by prohibiting practices that posed a threat to 
investors and the integrity of the market.32  However, insider trading is 
fundamentally different than the harmful practices that concerned Congress 
in the early 1930s.33  Furthermore, some evidence suggests the early 
condemnation of insider trading may have been exaggerated to capitalize on 
political momentum at the time.34 
To put the act of insider trading in perspective, Part I.A.1 briefly 
discusses two practices that concerned Congress and members of the public 
in the early twentieth century:  price manipulation and uninformed 
speculation.  Part I.A.2 discusses the government’s denunciation of those 
practices in responding to the stock market crash of 1929. 
1.  Price Manipulation and Uninformed Speculation 
Price manipulation is a general term for practices whereby consumers are 
forced to pay a higher price for a given commodity.35  For example, a group 
of investors might carry out a “corner” by purchasing a commodity’s entire 
supply and thereafter charging monopolistic prices.36  Speculation, 
meanwhile, is the act of “forecasting changes of value and buying or selling 
in order to take advantage of them.”37  While speculation “based on an 
intelligent forecast” is beneficial to the market and its participants,38 
speculation performed by those lacking means and experience is harmful.39 
Such practices are by no means recent phenomena; “[h]istory is strewn 
with unsuccessful efforts by governments and organized religions to 
proscribe speculation and price manipulation and to control commodity 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. While modern market regulators are primarily concerned with insider trading, “the 
regulatory concern that prompted the Exchange Act was the prevention of manipulation, 
uninformed trading that artificially influences stock prices.” Id. 
 34. Id. at 344–49. 
 35. For an interesting primer on several price manipulation “stratagems,” see JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 3–
9 (2014). 
 36. See id. at 3–4. 
 37. STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF GOVERNOR HUGHES’S COMMITTEE ON SPECULATION IN 
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES 3 (1909) [hereinafter HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 38. See id. at 4. 
 39. See id.  This latter form of speculation will hereinafter be referred to as “uninformed 
speculation.” 
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prices.”40  In the United States, price manipulation was prevalent early on,41 
and some manipulative tactics had appeared in the securities market by the 
early twentieth century.42 
Securities manipulation was largely carried out by “crooked” stock 
pools—investor groups largely comprised of various corporate insiders.43  
Members of these crooked stock pools would use their privileged access to 
material nonpublic information to accurately value a given security.44  
Armed with substantial financial capital, crooked stock pools placed trades 
that altered market activity.45  These pools manipulated market prices by 
purchasing the same securities that they were selling, thereby artificially 
inflating the stock’s price by creating the appearance of increased 
demand.46  In reaction to the increased market activity, other investors 
would purchase the security under the assumption that the increased trading 
activity was an accurate reflection of the market’s valuation of the stock.47  
After the stock’s market price had reached a certain height, the stock pools 
would sell their shares, thereby decreasing demand and deflating the stock’s 
market price.48  By collectively trading in a company’s stock to generate the 
false appearance of increased activity, stock poolers profited by selling their 
holdings at inflated prices, while average investors lost money by 
overpaying for fraudulently overpriced stocks.49 
Such manipulative tactics as those carried out by certain stock pools in 
the early twentieth century caused havoc and raised concern among 
government officials well before the Great Depression.  For example, the 
“Panic of 1907”occurred when several New York banks collapsed after a 
 
 40. MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 9. 
 41. See id. at 14–30. 
 42. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 393 (1990) (“If securities manipulation means anything in 
particular, it means conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price to 
an artificial level.”). 
 43. See COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (7th ed. 2013); 
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 12–13 (1954); Mahoney, supra note 
31, at 346, 351. 
 44. GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 12–13.  This provided stock pool members with an 
advantage over uninformed investors because, at the time, investment banks rarely 
underwrote securities. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 350. 
 45. See Thel, supra note 42, at 413 (suggesting that the pools relied on “the brute force 
of concentrated economic resources”); see also GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 12–13 
(“[E]ven the most devout Wall Streeter allow[ed] himself on occasion to believe that more 
personal influences have a hand in his destiny.  Somewhere around there are big men who 
put stocks up and put them down.”). 
 46. See GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 79 (“During 1929 more than a hundred issues on 
the New York Stock Exchange were subject to manipulative operations, in which members 
of the Exchange or their partners had participated.”).  For an oft-cited description of a classic 
stock pool, see id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 351 (“To the extent that pool participants were not 
merely informed, but company insiders, a modern commentator would condemn these pools 
for facilitating insider trading.  While this is a current concern, it was not the Senate’s 
concern in 1934.  Congress condemned manipulation, not insider trading.”). 
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group of investors failed “to corner the market in the stock of a copper 
mining company they controlled,” causing a small recession.50  
Subsequently, a rumor circulated among the public that Wall Street had 
gone crooked; word had it that corporate insiders had fraudulently inflated 
stock prices to profit at the expense of unknowing investors.51  While 
proposals for stock market reform failed to gain traction in Congress, New 
York Governor Charles Hughes appointed a committee (“the Hughes 
Committee”) to conduct an investigation into practices at the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).52  The Hughes Committee’s goal was to identify 
harmful practices and determine whether any specific regulations could 
efficiently deter such harmful behavior.53 
The Hughes Committee report on its investigation was primarily 
concerned with “speculation,” which it defined as “forecasting changes of 
value and buying or selling in order to take advantage of them.”54  The 
report distinguished between speculation carried on by “persons of means 
and experience, and based on intelligent forecast,” which it found 
accomplished “an amount of good which offsets much of its cost,” and 
speculation performed by persons without means or experience 
(uninformed speculation),55 which the Hughes Committee found had the 
potential to cause “an almost incalculable amount of evil.”56  The Hughes 
Committee believed it was necessary to prevent uninformed speculation 
while preserving the benefits of informed speculation.57  The Hughes 
Committee recommended against government intervention,58 however, 
recognizing the “practical impossibility of distinguishing between what is 
virtually gambling from legitimate speculation.”59  Instead of enacting rigid 
statutes that might hamper proper transactions, the Hughes Committee 
believed that the NYSE could better address harmful practices.60  Despite 
the Hughes Committee’s caution, however, reformers used the critique of 
speculative practices to increase support for stock market reform.61 
 
 50. Thel, supra note 42, at 395–97. See generally ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CAR, 
THE PANIC OF 1907 (2007). 
 51. See Thel, supra note 42, at 395 n.41. 
 52. See id. at 395. 
 53. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See supra note 39. 
 56. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 4. 
 57. “The most fruitful policy will be found in measures which will lessen speculation by 
persons not qualified to engage in it.” Id. 
 58. “No law, the [Hughes] Committee argued, could clearly distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate transactions, and any effort to reform the exchanges by statute 
would hobble and eventually destroy the market.” Thel, supra note 42, at 400. 
 59. See HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 4. 
 60. See id. at 5. 
 61. Thel, supra note 42, at 400–02 (“When stock market reform becomes a political 
issue, the public debate has historically brushed over the question of whether reforms are 
necessary and gone directly to their design:  the question of what the reform should be.”). 
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2.  Reform Becomes Reality 
The economic catastrophe that was the Great Depression saw the total 
value of all NYSE-listed securities drop by roughly 83 percent between 
1929 and 1932.62  While the exact cause of the Great Depression is still 
subject to debate,63 many people at the time—whose memories of events 
like the Panic of 1907 were still fresh—generally blamed speculators and 
market makers for the stock market’s collapse.64  Despite knowing who to 
blame, average investors at that time lacked legal protection against 
crooked stock pools.  Aside from asserting a state law fraud claim, there 
were no judicial remedies available for securities manipulation victims to 
pursue.65  Thus, absent some duty to the corporation, the market, or its 
investors, crooked stock poolers could conduct fraudulent operations 
without incurring liability.66  In the eyes of a recovering public, regulation 
of the nation’s stock exchanges was necessary to prevent a relapse of the 
Great Depression.67 
In 1932, the Senate’s Banking and Currency Committee (SBCC) was 
directed to investigate and report on stock exchange practices.68  The 
investigations piqued the public’s interest once President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt appointed Ferdinand Pecora as the SBCC’s chief counsel in 
1933.69  Prior to his appointment, Pecora had exposed “fabulous excesses in 
investment, commercial banking, and the financing of public utilities.”70  
As chief counsel, Pecora hauled some of Wall Street’s largest figures before 
 
 62. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 7 (stating that the total value of all securities on the 
NYSE fell from $89 billion to $15 billion). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Thel, supra note 42, at 408–11.  “The public eventually concluded, just as it had 
after the panic of 1907, that speculators had pushed the market to unreasonable heights and 
that short sales had precipitated the collapse.” Id. at 410–11; see also COX ET AL., supra note 
43, at 7. 
 65. While state courts were successful in tackling deceptive statements and practices, 
they had not yet developed a solution to securities manipulation. See Thel, supra note 42, at 
407 n.96 (citing Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. 
REV. 264, 272–73 (1931)). 
 66. See id.  Adolf Berle, who was considered one of the “most influential 
commentator[s] on corporate finance” at the time, hoped that American courts would follow 
English courts in curtailing securities manipulation “on the theory that it is somehow 
fraudulent to trade for the purpose of creating a market price that does not represent the 
trader’s own appraisal of value.” Id. 
 67. See id. at 409–11.  “[I]n 1934 there was a widespread consensus that excessive stock 
market speculation and the collapse of the stock market had brought down the economy, and 
that those who enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with preventing a 
recurrence.” See id. at 409. 
 68. S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. (1932). 
 69. Thel, supra note 42, at 412.  “[A]ny description of [the federal securities laws’] 
legislative history must begin with the dramatic hearings that Mr. Pecora conducted.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at xiii–xiv (J. Ellenberger & E. Maher eds., 1973)).  But 
see Mahoney, supra note 31, at 347–48 (suggesting that Pecora “treated the brokers and 
bankers who testified as accused criminals” and “presupposed the existence of wrongdoing” 
to capitalize on public animosity toward Wall Street and further his own political ambitions). 
 70. Thel, supra note 42, at 412. 
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the SBCC and repeatedly uncovered evidence that many NYSE members 
participated in stock pools.71  By bringing these activities to light, Pecora 
sought to capitalize on the public’s animosity toward Wall Street to 
promote the President’s remedial agenda as well as his own political 
ambitions.72 
The Pecora hearings have been criticized for demonstrating political bias 
against the witnesses73 to capitalize on the public’s infuriation with Wall 
Street at the time.74  At least one scholar has argued that the SBCC’s 
investigation would have been better served by hearing testimony from 
prominent academics of the time “who maintained the undesirability of the 
practice” rather than the bankers and executives involved.75  Another 
criticism of the hearings is that the SBCC members apparently did not fully 
understand the mechanics for determining the prices of financial assets.76 
Regardless, the Pecora hearings undoubtedly “colored the atmosphere in 
which the Exchange Act was proposed, considered, and adopted.”77  
However, the harmful practices that the Pecora hearings targeted—price 
manipulation and uninformed speculation—were dissimilar to insider 
trading.78  In contrast to price manipulation, insider trading does not require 
the creation of a false appearance of market activity.  Rather, the act of 
insider trading entails the use of presumptively valid information to place 
the informed investor in a position to profit from the anticipation of some 
imminent market event.79  Furthermore, given that informed investors are 
trading on credible information, insider trading more closely resembles 
informed speculation than uninformed speculation, which the Hughes 
Committee feared would bring harm to the market as a whole.80  Simply 
put, insider trading today is fundamentally different from the harmful 
practices that concerned Congress in the years preceding the enactment of 
the Exchange Act. 
B.  Insider Trading as Fraud 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act,81 in part to 
prevent manipulation. 82  Section 10(b)83 was intended to serve as a catchall 
 
 71. See id. at 412–13. 
 72. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 347. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Thel, supra note 42, at 408–09. 
 75. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 9 (1966).  By eliciting 
testimony from the wrongdoers as opposed to academics or learned reformers, the Pecora 
hearings seem to have been more of a trial than an attempt to ascertain the best means by 
which reform might be achieved. 
 76. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 348.  For example, “[t]he Exchange Act was written on 
the assumption that the stock market is not rational,” which is contrary to the modern 
conception. Thel, supra note 42, at 410. 
 77. Thel, supra note 42, at 413. 
 78. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 344. 
 79. See MANNE, supra note 75, at 77–91. 
 80. See supra notes 54–57. 
 81. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp 
(2012)).  
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provision to encapsulate manipulative practices not yet employed in the 
stock markets.84  To accomplish this goal, section 10(b) afforded the SEC 
expansive authority to define fraud in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities.85  The SEC subsequently enacted Rule 10b-5, which makes it 
unlawful to 
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, [t]o make any untrue 
statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading, or [t]o engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.86 
Thus, a claim brought under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 must allege that 
the claimant suffered a harm as a result of fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.87  Because insider trading is not explicitly 
mentioned, let alone prohibited, anywhere in the Exchange Act,88  
sustaining a claim for insider trading required a theory under which the act 
of trading on material nonpublic information constituted fraud within the 
meaning of section 10(b).89 
In 1961, SEC Chairman William Cary proposed such a theory when the 
SEC decided Cady, Roberts & Co.90  In that case, the SEC held that a 
person commits fraud under section 10(b) when she breaches a fiduciary 
duty owed to a corporation’s shareholders by trading on material nonpublic 
information acquired by virtue of her position within the corporation.91 
The SEC ruled that a corporate insider has a duty to disclose any material 
nonpublic information before trading in that corporation’s securities.92  
Where disclosure prior to trading is impractical, the insider must abstain 
 
 82. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 346. 
 83. Under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it is unlawful 
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 84. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
 85. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 344 (“The Exchange Act sought to curb manipulation by 
bans on specific practices such as reporting fictitious trades, by a general prohibition on 
‘raising or depressing the price of [any listed] security, for the purpose of inducing the 
purchase or sale of such security by others,’ and by granting the SEC broad authority to 
define and prohibit manipulative devices.” (alterations in original)). 
 86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 87. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 905–06.  Even after Congress enacted the 
Exchange Act, insider trading actions were brought under state corporate law as common 
law fraud claims until the 1960s. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 7. 
 88. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 25–27; see also Currier, supra note 30, at 92. 
 89. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 906 (“Much of the conceptual difficulty in the law 
of insider trading is the product of a misfit between the broad fairness-based aim of the 
prohibition and the narrower statutory mechanism that must be used to combat it.”). 
 90. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 91. Id. at 911. 
 92. See id. 
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from trading.93  Known as the “disclose or abstain rule,” this ruling became 
the foundation for the insider trading prohibition under section 10(b).94 
The Supreme Court endorsed the disclose or abstain rule nearly two 
decades later in Chiarella v. United States.95  Vincent Chiarella traded on 
material nonpublic information he acquired from documents obtained in the 
course of his profession as a printer.96  While the target corporation’s 
identity had been explicitly concealed, Chiarella identified the target 
corporation using other information in the documents.97 
Relying heavily on the SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision, the Court held that 
a corporate insider commits fraud under section 10(b) by trading on 
material nonpublic information disclosed in breach of “a relationship of 
trust and confidence” owed to the corporation’s shareholders.98  The breach 
of such a fiduciary duty, the Court held, constituted the fraud required by 
section 10(b).99  The Court’s goal was to ensure that corporate insiders did 
not profit at the expense of minority shareholders.100 
While endorsing the disclose or abstain rule, the Court ultimately held 
that, because Chiarella was not a corporate insider, he neither received 
“confidential information from the target company” nor relied on the target 
corporation’s information.101  Rather, Chiarella relied on “only the plans of 
the acquiring company,” and he did not owe a duty of trust and confidence 
to the target corporation’s stockholders.102  The Court explained that “a 
purchaser of stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is 
neither an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to 
reveal material facts.”103  Thus, Chiarella’s conviction was improper 
because the jury instructions failed to specify whether the defendant was 
subject to an affirmative duty to disclose the information prior to trading.104 
 
 93. Id.  The decision in Cady, Roberts was “settled by consent and never reviewed by a 
court.” MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 241. 
 94. See infra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
 95. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 96. See id. at 224. 
 97. See id.  The defendant realized a gain of $30,000 over the course of fourteen months. 
Id.  Compared to some of the other insider trading defendants at the time, Chiarella’s profits 
were meager. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 52. 
 98. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29. 
 99. Id. at 230. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 231. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 229.  But see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 653, 555–66 (1997) 
(endorsing the “misappropriation theory,” which expanded the list of persons who incur 
liability as corporate insiders to include those who owe a duty of trust and confidence to the 
source of the material nonpublic information by virtue of their professional relationship, 
such as lawyers and accountants).  Under the misappropriation theory, Chiarella’s conviction 
may have been upheld. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAW 133–34 (3d ed. 2011) (suggesting that five of the Justices in Chiarella “would have 
upheld a conviction based on a theory that the defendant was given information in a position 
of trust and then wrongfully misappropriated the information to his advantage”). 
 104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229.  The Court also suggested that tippees may incur liability 
when they use confidential information that they know originates from a corporate insider 
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Although the government advocated for the adoption of an “equal access 
to information” theory, the Court explicitly rejected this theory as a basis 
for the insider trading prohibition.105  Financial unfairness does not always 
constitute fraud under section 10(b).106  Rather, such unfairness is only 
fraudulent where there is a duty to disclose arising out of a fiduciary 
relationship with the corporation’s shareholders.107  Because Chiarella was 
not a fiduciary, but rather “a complete stranger,” he was not under a duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading.108 
The Supreme Court established in Chiarella that a claim for insider 
trading under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 requires a breach of a preexisting 
duty of trust and confidence.  That holding clearly precluded corporate 
insiders from using their positions within their respective corporations from 
profiting off information acquired in the course of their professional 
responsibilities.  Three years later, in Dirks v. SEC,109 the Supreme Court 
discussed the application of the disclose or abstain rule to tippees—people 
who lack preexisting duties to a target corporation’s stockholders but 
acquire information directly from someone with inside information.110 
Raymond Dirks, an officer at a New York broker-dealer firm, received 
information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer at Equity Funding (EF), 
suggesting that EF’s assets were vastly overstated due to fraudulent 
corporate practices.111  Dirks then embarked on a two-week investigation, 
discussing the information openly with fellow investors,112 clients, and the 
Los Angeles bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.113  Over the course of 
Dirks’s two-week investigation, EF stock plummeted from twenty-six 
dollars per share to less than fifteen dollars per share.114  The SEC 
 
because the tippee has an obligation “arising from his role as a participant after the fact in 
the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” See id. at 230 n.12. 
 105. See id. at 232–33. 
 106. See id. at 232. 
 107. See id.  The Court also rejected the “regular access to market information” test, 
which would impose liability on “[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—who regularly 
receives material nonpublic information” in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities. Id. at 231 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), 
rev’d, 445 U.S. 222).  In the case below, the Second Circuit believed a “regular access to 
market information” test would “create a workable rule embracing ‘those who occupy . . . 
strategic places in the market mechanism.’” Id. at 231 n.14 (quoting Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 
1365).  However, the Court rejected this theory because it was “unrelated to the existence of 
a duty to disclose.” Id. at 231. 
 108. See id. at 233–34.  The idea that the “complete stranger” may escape liability has 
added to the confusion over who exactly may be charged under the federal securities laws. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) 
(No. 15-628). 
 109. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 110. See supra note 8. 
 111. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49. 
 112. Five investment advisors liquidated holdings exceeding $16 million. Id. at 649. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 650. 
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subsequently launched an investigation into trades in EF securities that 
occurred during Dirks’s investigation.115 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that “[a] duty [to disclose] 
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s 
ability to acquire information because of his position in the market.”116  
Thus, while identifying Congress’s intent to exempt trading that 
“contribute[s] to a fair and orderly marketplace,”117 the Court also 
recognized a need to ban tippee trading resulting from the exploitation of a 
corporate insider’s privileged access to material nonpublic information.118  
The Court stated that 
[i]n holding that breaches of this duty to shareholders violated the 
Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, Roberts Commission recognized, and 
we agree, that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to 
eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage 
was a normal emolument of corporate office.”119 
Holding otherwise “would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the 
name of others that the trustee could not conduct [on] his own.”120 
The Court explained that, under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a tippee’s 
liability derives from the insider’s duty to the corporation’s shareholders.121  
Therefore, the Court ruled that a tippee commits insider trading when she 
trades on material nonpublic information that was originally disclosed in 
breach of a fiduciary duty.122  To determine whether a breach occurred, the 
Court stated that the test was “whether the insider will personally benefit, 
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”123  Without some personal 
benefit to the insider, the Court explained, there is no breach of fiduciary 
duty and thus no derivative breach by the tippee.124  Therefore, a tippee’s 
liability for insider trading turns on the tipper’s intentions and the tippee’s 
knowledge thereof.125 
The Court overturned the judgment against Dirks because Secrist did not 
disclose the information for a personal benefit.126  Rather, the Court 
concluded that Secrist was motivated by a desire to expose EF’s fraudulent 
 
 115. While the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief initially declined to 
publish a story on Dirks’s information, the Wall Street Journal eventually released a front-
page story after the SEC launched its investigation. Id. at 649–50. 
 116. Id. at 657–58 (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 231 n.14 (1980)). 
 117. See id. at 657 n.16.  The Court recognized that imposing a broad ban on trading on 
any material nonpublic information “could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market 
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy 
market.” Id. at 658. 
 118. Id. at 659. 
 119. Id. at 653 n.10 (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). 
 120. Id. at 659 (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 660. 
 123. Id. at 662. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 665–67. 
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practices.127  Therefore, Dirks did not incur liability as a tippee because 
Secrist had not disclosed the information in exchange for any personal 
benefit.128 
While the Dirks personal benefit test limits tippee liability to 
circumstances in which information is disclosed in exchange for a personal 
benefit, the Court recognized that it will not always be clear whether a 
breach occurred.129  As a guiding principle, the Court instructed lower 
courts to “focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a 
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary 
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”130  A 
personal benefit to the tipper may be drawn where there is evidence of a 
quid pro quo relationship between the tipper and primary tippee.131  Such 
an inference may also be drawn, the Court stated, where the insider intends 
“to benefit the particular recipient” or “makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.”132  However, the Court did not 
precisely define what types of relationships may satisfy the “trading relative 
or friend” standard.133  Thus, there may be some situations where, absent 
any clear, tangible benefit to the insider, it will be difficult to determine 
whether the person to whom the tipper originally discloses the information 
constitutes a “trading relative or friend,” especially where that 
determination must be made by a remote tippee. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. But see id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The effect of Dirks’ selective 
dissemination of Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses 
that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to uninformed market 
participants.”). 
 129. See id. at 664 (majority opinion).  As the Court recently recognized, that uncertainty 
lingers today. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (“It remains the case 
that ‘[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a 
question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.’” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)). 
 130. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 (emphasis omitted); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders, 
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 322, 348 (1979) (“The theory . . . is that the insider, by giving the information out 
selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal 
information, or other things of value for himself . . . .”). 
 131. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 132. Id. (emphasis added).  “The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” Id. 
 133. Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent illustrates the difficulty of applying the personal 
benefit test: 
The Court’s approach is particularly difficult to administer when the insider is not 
directly enriched monetarily by the trading he induces.  For example, the Court 
does not explain why the benefit Secrist obtained—the good feeling of exposing a 
fraud and his enhanced reputation—is any different from the benefit to an insider 
who gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. . . .  Secrist surely gave 
Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order to induce him to 
disseminate the information.  The distinction between pure altruism and self-
interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe that 
courts and administrative law judges will have an easier time with it. 
Id. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Reinforcing Dirks 
While the justification for the ban on insider trading received the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement, the range of conduct proscribed by the law 
was not as broad as the government had argued for.134  Following Dirks, the 
government took several steps to further deter individuals from trading on 
material nonpublic information.  First, Congress enacted the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984135 (ITSA), which increased both the civil and 
criminal penalties for insider trading.136  While ITSA illustrated Congress’s 
intent to increase the severity of punishment for insider trading, it did not 
alter the Supreme Court’s definition of insider trading as established in 
Chiarella and Dirks.137  Nonetheless, ITSA gave the SEC greater 
negotiating power in settlement talks, as evidenced by its ability to reach 
more lucrative settlements.138 
The SEC also promulgated three major rules to better define some of the 
requisite elements of insider trading.  First, the SEC promulgated 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) in 2000, which sought to prevent 
corporate insiders from disclosing material nonpublic information to select 
shareholders and market professionals.139  The SEC saw selective 
disclosure as a method that facilitated insider trading,140 likely because it 
provides select investors with an informational advantage over the average 
investor.  Reg FD prevents parties from attaining such an advantage by 
requiring all publicly traded companies to disclose material nonpublic 
information to all investors at the same time.141 
Second, Rule 10b5-1 creates a presumption that an individual trades “on 
the basis of” material nonpublic information anytime that individual was 
aware of the material nonpublic information when she traded.142  While this 
presumption may be rebutted by any of the affirmative defenses in 
subsection (c), those defenses are narrow, requiring the individual to have 
had some written commitment or plan to trade on the securities in question 
 
 134. See supra notes 105–07. 
 135. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012)). 
 136. Id.  Specifically, the criminal penalty was increased tenfold, from $10,000 to 
$100,000. Id. § 3, 98 Stat. at 1265.  The SEC may seek both disgorgement and damages 
amounting to three times the profit gained or loss avoided. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, 
at 131.  In practice, however, the SEC often varies the amount of punitive damages sought 
based on the severity of the infraction. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS 
LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 201–02 (2d ed. 2007). 
 137. See HAZEN, supra note 103, at 139 (“Thus, [ITSA] does not alter the availability of a 
cause of action, merely the penalties that may be imposed.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:1. 
 140. See id. 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).  However, some recent evidence suggests that similar, 
yet less explicit, practices still occur. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (indicating that “analysts routinely solicit[] information from companies in order 
to check assumptions in their models in advance of earnings announcements”). 
 142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2016). 
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prior to receiving the information.143  Thus, Rule 10b5-1 implicitly eases 
the pleading and proving standards in bringing an action for insider 
trading.144 
Third, Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexhaustive list of relationships in 
which a duty of trust or confidence exists.145  These include situations 
where there is an agreement “to maintain information in confidence,” where 
the parties have routinely shared confidences with each other, and where a 
person discloses information to a “spouse, parent, child, or sibling.”146  
However, Rule 10b5-2’s validity has been called into question.147  While 
the Supreme Court’s recent Salman decision was not inconsistent with Rule 
10b5-2, the Supreme Court made no mention of the rule in its opinion.148 
D.  The Recent Controversy:  Newman and Salman 
Since Dirks, lower courts have faced difficulty in applying the personal 
benefit test to cases involving remote tippees and more complex tipping 
chains.149  As a result, lower courts have “eased the standards for both 
pleading and proving” the requisite elements in insider trading cases.150  
For example, some courts have not required “specific allegations of 
personal benefit in pleadings.”151  Additionally, courts have deemed 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a tipper’s intentions in 
disclosing information.152  Furthermore, some “courts have downplayed the 
requirement of knowledge of breach of duty by repeating or emphasizing 
that information has been obtained ‘improperly.’”153  This approach could 
allow liability to be improperly imposed where no actual breach 
occurred.154  These trends have implicitly imposed a fairness-based 
approach,155 which directly contradicts explicit Supreme Court 
precedent.156 
In December 2014, however, the Second Circuit’s holding in United 
States v. Newman157 curtailed the drifting jurisprudence.158  Todd Newman 
 
 143. See id. § 240.10b5-1(c); HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137–38.  The SEC had originally 
adopted a “possession test” but, after receiving comments from the public, later “reproposed 
the rule to adopt the use requirement plus a presumption of use.” Id. at 137 n.609. 
 144. See HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137. 
 145. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b). 
 146. HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137. 
 147. See id. at 135 n.595 (citing United States v. Kim, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 
2001)).  “It remains difficult to define situations in which there is a sufficient duty that gives 
rise to Rule 10b-5’s ‘disclose or abstain from trading’ obligation with regard to material 
nonpublic information.” Id. at 134. 
 148. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 149. See Coles, supra note 7, at 184. 
 150. Id. at 208. 
 151. Id. at 208 n.166. 
 152. Id. at 208 n.167. 
 153. Id. at 210. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 211. 
 156. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 233 n.16 (1980). 
 157. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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and Anthony Chiasson, hedge fund managers at Diamondback and Level 
Global, respectively, traded on information relayed to them by their 
analysts.159  A group of analysts had shared material nonpublic information, 
including earnings reports, obtained from employees of technology 
companies Dell and NVIDIA.160  Rob Ray, a member of Dell’s investor 
relations department, had tipped Neuberger Berman analyst Sandy Goyal, 
who in turn tipped Diamondback analyst Jesse Tortora, who ultimately 
relayed the information to Newman.161  Tortora also tipped Level Global 
analyst Spyridon “Sam” Adondakis, who passed the tip along to 
Chiasson.162  The second tipping chain originated with Chris Choi, a 
member of NVIDIA’s finance unit, who tipped fellow churchgoer Hyung 
Lim,163 who then tipped Whittier Trust analyst Danny Kuo.164  Kuo then 
provided the information to the group of analysts, including Tortora and 
Adondakis, who in turn relayed the information to Newman and 
Chiasson.165  An illustration of the complex tipping chain is provided 
below. 
  
 
 158. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:9. 
 159. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
 160. Id. at 443. 
 161. Id.  Newman was three levels removed from Ray. Id. 
 162. Id.  Chiasson was four levels removed from Ray. Id. 
 163. Id.  Lim was also a former Broadcom Corporation and Altera Corporation executive. 
Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  Newman and Chiasson were both four levels removed from Choi. Id. 
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Figure 1:  Dell Tipping Chain 
 
Figure 2:  NVIDIA Tipping Chain 
 
At the close of the government’s case in chief, Newman and Chiasson 
argued that the government had failed to present any evidence that Ray or 
Choi received a personal benefit in exchange for the material nonpublic 
information or that either defendant knew of any such benefit.166  
Alternatively, Newman and Chiasson “requested that the court instruct the 
jury that it must find that Newman and Chiasson knew that the corporate 
insiders had disclosed confidential information for personal benefit in order 
to find them guilty.”167  Instead, the district court instructed the jury that, to 
return a guilty verdict, they must find that the defendants “knew that the 
material, nonpublic information had been disclosed by the insider in breach 
of a duty of trust and confidence.”168  The jury subsequently found both 
defendants guilty on all counts.169 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions because the 
government presented no evidence that either defendant was aware of any 
personal benefit to Ray or Choi.170  The court found that the jury 
instructions were inadequate because “a reasonable juror might have 
concluded that a defendant could be criminally liable for insider trading 
merely if such defendant knew that an insider had divulged information that 
 
 166. Id. at 444. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 451 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1999)). 
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was required to be kept confidential.”171  Thus, the Second Circuit deemed 
the convictions improper.172 
The Second Circuit also stated that the inference of a personal benefit to 
either Ray or Choi was impermissible.173  Both Ray and Choi were found to 
have social relationships with their respective primary tippees.174  Ray and 
Goyal attended business school together and also had been colleagues at 
Dell.175  Goyal had also given Ray career advice and helped him with his 
resume before Ray ever provided Goyal with any inside information.176  
With respect to the NVIDIA chain, Choi and Lim were fellow churchgoers 
who “occasionally socialized together.”177  While the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that an insider may receive a personal benefit “from simply 
making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,”178 
the court rejected the notion that a personal benefit could be inferred “by 
the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature.”179  
The Second Circuit feared that permitting the inference of a personal 
benefit under such circumstances could essentially nullify the personal 
benefit requirement.180 
The Second Circuit also discussed whether knowledge of a breach could 
be inferred from the type of the material nonpublic information.  The court 
acknowledged that, in general, knowledge may be inferred where the 
information traded on is of a certain specificity.181  However, the evidence 
suggested that the investor relations departments at Dell and NVIDIA 
frequently aided analysts by affirming the accuracy of their models and by 
leaking information about their earnings reports in advance.182  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that knowledge of a breach could not 
be inferred “where the financial information is of a nature regularly and 
accurately predicted by analyst modeling, and the tippees are several levels 
removed from the source.”183  The court further held that even where the 
specificity of the information would permit inferring knowledge regarding 
 
 171. Id. at 450; see Coles, supra note 7, at 210 (“[A] generalized focus on knowledge of 
‘improperly’ obtained information could allow liability to be based on improper acts that 
involve no actual breach of duty by insiders.”). 
 172. Newman, 773 F.3d at 451. 
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the information’s source, “it cannot, without more, permit an inference as to 
that source’s improper motive for disclosure.”184 
The Second Circuit noted that it had never considered, nor had it found 
any cases where other courts had considered, a case involving tippees as far 
removed from the original tipper as Newman and Chiasson.185  In stressing 
the significance of the knowledge requirement, the Newman decision 
illustrated the difficulty of establishing that a remote tippee several levels 
removed from the source knew that the information was improperly 
disclosed.186  This created some concern that prosecutions against remote 
tippees would be virtually impossible to sustain.187 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman,188 and some scholars 
believe that the Second Circuit’s holding signaled a change in insider 
trading jurisprudence.189  A few months later in Salman v. United States,190 
the Ninth Circuit expressed its disapproval of Newman by declining to 
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning.  The Supreme Court later took up 
the issue to resolve the apparent circuit split.191 
Bassam Salman traded on material nonpublic information that originated 
with Maher Kara, a Citigroup employee who was also Salman’s brother-in-
law.192  Maher conveyed material nonpublic information to his older 
brother Michael.193  Without Maher’s knowledge, Michael relayed the 
information to his friends, including Salman.194  The evidence established 
that Maher intended the information to benefit his brother195 and that 
Salman was well aware of Maher and Michael’s close relationship.196  At 
the close of trial, Salman was convicted on one count of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud and four counts of securities fraud.197 
On appeal, Salman pointed to Newman, arguing that he could not be held 
liable as a tippee because “there was no evidence that Maher received 
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 188. See United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). 
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 190. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
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 192. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424. 
 193. Id.  The evidence suggests that, initially, Maher sought Michael’s chemistry 
expertise to help him grasp concepts at his new job and that Maher did not even know that 
Michael was trading on the information they discussed. See id.  Eventually, however, Maher 
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asked for information instead.” Id. at 424. 
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 197. Id. at 424–25. 
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anything of ‘a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange—or that 
Salman knew of any such benefit.”198  The Ninth Circuit disagreed; Salman 
could easily have inferred Maher’s intent to benefit his brother due to the 
Kara brothers’ close relationship.199 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, finding that 
Maher breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup and its clients and that 
Salman had full knowledge of that breach because he was well aware of the 
Kara brothers’ relationship.200  Thus, the Court easily determined that 
Salman incurred liability derivatively as a remote tippee.201 
The Court upheld Dirks’s gift-giving standard, stating that the “gift of 
inside information to a relative like Michael is little different from trading 
on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading 
relative.  The tipper benefits either way.”202  The Court did not overrule 
Newman, but did state that any requirement that the tipper “receive 
something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a 
gift to family or friends . . . is inconsistent with Dirks.”203  The Court did 
not comment on whether the relationships between the insiders and the 
primary tippees in Newman were sufficient to warrant the inference that the 
insider received a personal benefit in exchange for the information, nor did 
the Court provide a guiding principle to distinguish between relationships 
where an inference may properly be drawn from those where it may not.  
Thus, even where a remote tippee has full knowledge pertaining to the 
source of a tip, it will not always be clear whether a personal benefit 
accrued to the tipper.  Further, in cases where a remote tippee is less 
acquainted with the tipper and primary tippee than Salman was with the 
Mara brothers, it is not clear when a remote tippee should be expected to 
have sufficient knowledge of their relationship to determine whether the 
tipper personally benefitted from the disclosure. 
II.  REMOTE TIPPEES AFTER SALMAN 
In light of the lingering uncertainties following Newman and Salman, an 
investor cannot always determine whether trading on a tip is lawful.  Time 
spent investigating facts pertaining to the information’s source could be 
costly, but the risk of trading on information that was improperly disclosed 
could result in jail time for the eager trader.  To determine what courses of 
action may alleviate these concerns, Part II revisits the arguments for and 
against a ban on insider trading and considers various possible tests for 
determining a remote tippee’s liability.  Part II.A summarizes the relevant 
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 199. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420. 
 200. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427. 
 201. Id. 
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arguments regarding insider trading to ascertain whether any deviation from 
the existing law is warranted.  Part II.B then discusses various tests and 
approaches under which remote tippees could incur liability for insider 
trading, as well as possible supplemental rules that could alleviate the 
concerns presented by remote tippees. 
A.  Debating Insider Trading 
A discussion of various perspectives on the insider trading ban is helpful 
for understanding what goals and values a rule governing remote tippee 
liability should promote.  Part II.A.1 addresses the argument that insider 
trading produces more efficient market prices.  Part II.A.2 then presents the 
arguments supporting the prohibition on insider trading.  Finally, Part II.A.3 
discusses public choice theory as applied to insider trading. 
1.  Insider Trading as an Efficient Pricing Mechanism 
In 1966, law professor Henry G. Manne set forth the first major defense 
of insider trading, arguing that insider trading produces more accurate 
market prices.204  In an efficient capital market, a stock’s market value is a 
reflection of all material and publicly available information about that 
corporation and its activities.205  However, not all material information 
relevant to a stock’s value is always publicly available, and therefore a 
stock’s market price may not always be an accurate reflection of its true 
value.206  Manne suggested that insider trading essentially compensates for 
the information that is not available to the market and thereby increases 
demand for the stock.207  This increase in demand causes the stock’s market 
price to shift toward its true value:  the stock’s market value if all material 
information were publicly available.208  Manne’s theory assumes that the 
informed traders are the only investors affecting the security’s demand and 
that the size of their trades, in relation to the number of outstanding 
securities, are significant enough to affect the stock’s overall price.209  To 
that point, at least one study surveying targets of SEC enforcement actions 
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during the 1980s suggests that insider trading does have an impact on a 
security’s market price.210 
Even where insider trading is completely unregulated, insiders will be 
naturally restrained by two factors:  time and wealth.211  As time goes on, a 
stock’s value will gradually approach its true value because information 
will gradually leak to the public before any public announcement.212  Thus, 
the prospective gain (or forgone loss) that a trader may incur decreases as 
time goes on.213  Even if an informed investor is able to act immediately, 
the only way to realize the full value of the information is to purchase all of 
the corporation’s outstanding stock.214  Therefore, even if the law did not 
restrict investors from trading on material nonpublic information, investors 
typically would be limited to a fraction of the information’s total value. 
2.  Justifications for the Ban 
The mainstream argument in favor of prohibiting insider trading is rooted 
in fairness.  Proponents of the prohibition argue that insider trading destroys 
the integrity of the stock markets by giving those with access to material 
nonpublic information an unfair advantage over average investors.215  The 
fear is that allowing investors to profit from such an informational 
advantage at the expense of uninformed investors would ultimately 
discourage investor confidence.216  However, the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the fairness justification for prohibiting insider trading 
because unfairness is not “fraudulent activity under [section] 10(b).”217 
Stephen Bainbridge identifies two other types of fairness arguments in 
support of a prohibition.218  First, fairness may be defined as the duty owed 
by the agent to her principal; an agent should not be permitted to use her 
position within a corporation for personal gain, especially at the expense of 
the principal—the shareholders.219  However, this notion of fairness only 
justifies the insider trading prohibition if the principal is deprived of 
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something, which requires there to be an assignable property interest in 
material nonpublic information.220  Alternatively, fairness may be premised 
on the notion that investors must not harm one another.221  On an 
anonymous exchange, however, those who trade on material nonpublic 
information do not cause the transacting party to purchase or sell its shares.  
Thus, it is practically impossible to distinguish losses sustained or gains 
forgone as the result of insider trading from those resulting from poor 
investment decision making for purposes of imposing liability.222 
Insider trading may also cause harm to the issuer in a variety of ways.223  
Some scholars argue that any insider trading prohibition must exist to 
ensure the proper maintenance of the mandatory disclosure system,224 
which is arguably the chief purpose of the Exchange Act.225  Without 
mandatory disclosure, officers and managers might use confidential 
information for personal advantage226 and, consequently, delay disclosure 
to their coworkers and the public to ensure their own profit.227  While the 
time taken by one manager to trade on the information before relaying it to 
her superiors may be minimal, allowing all insiders to trade on the material 
nonpublic information could result in substantial delays.228  This may also 
cause the corporation to incur greater administrative costs to ensure the 
efficient transition of information.229  These costs would likely be 
magnified if insiders were permitted to disclose material nonpublic 
information to friends and family, as they would have to wait until each of 
those parties had traded before relaying the information to their colleagues. 
Additionally, insider trading could interfere with corporate plans.230  For 
example, in the context of a merger or acquisition, trading in the securities 
of the target company by insiders of the acquiring company before the offer 
is made public may increase the cost of the merger or acquisition as insiders 
drive up the target corporation’s stock price.231 
Even more dangerous is the possibility that managers may make 
decisions that will cause the greatest fluctuation in the corporation’s stock 
price, allowing them to profit by purchasing or shorting the stock at the 
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right time.232  This could cause managers to make decisions in accordance 
with their own interests, rather than decisions in the best interests of the 
shareholders.  However, these concerns may be overstated because 
management often has a greater incentive to maximize the corporation’s 
value, which favors choosing projects with a positive net present value.233  
This overriding incentive is also less likely to be outweighed by a 
manager’s incentive to hamper corporate plans to benefit a remote tippee 
who is unrelated to the manager. 
Finally, insider trading might harm a corporation’s reputation.234  Such 
reputational injury may result if prospective shareholders demand a 
premium for purchasing stock in a corporation in which managers trade on 
their own material nonpublic information.235  However, Bainbridge argues 
that reputational harm will not materialize unless there is a “plausible 
shareholder injury story,” which he asserts is difficult to create.236 
3.  Public Choice Theory 
As applied to the insider trading ban, public choice theory suggests that 
the prohibition may serve the interests of special interest groups, such as the 
SEC and certain market professionals.237  If the law were to cover a broader 
range of conduct, which has always captured the public’s attention, the SEC 
could justifiably argue for a greater allocation of federal funds.238  Thus, the 
SEC would benefit by increasing its budget to support its enforcement 
program.239  Similarly, market professionals who set market prices benefit 
from a rule encompassing a broader range of conduct because informed 
investors profit from the market professionals’ uninformed price setting.240  
However, informed investors would benefit from a narrow prohibition 
because they would have more freedom to trade on information garnered 
through their informational advantage. 
The SEC was intended to be a neutral regulatory body, and Manne argues 
that the SEC should adopt a more neutral stance on insider trading in 
accordance with that role.241  However, the SEC’s numerous attempts to 
ease the pleading and proof standards for sustaining a claim for insider 
trading242 suggest that its stance has been more one sided than its regulatory 
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role might call for.  The Supreme Court has rejected a complete ban on 
trading on material nonpublic information, noting that such a ban would 
contravene congressional intent.243  The SEC would benefit from adopting 
rules that accord with the Court’s holdings because it would better reflect 
Congress’s intent for the SEC to serve as a neutral regulatory authority. 
B.  The Various Proposals for Remote Tippee Liability 
The proper analysis for imposing liability on remote tippees is still open 
for debate.  If the courts were to deviate from the Dirks personal benefit 
test, there are several possible replacements that offer varying standards for 
determining a remote tippee’s liability.  Part II.B.1 briefly addresses the 
mechanics of a fairness test.  Next, Part II.B.2 discusses the implications of 
using the most restrictive reading of the personal benefit test.  Part II.B.3 
then addresses a slightly broader chain approach similar to the personal 
benefit test, which is discussed in Part II.B.4.  Finally, Parts II.B.5 and 
II.B.6 discuss possible solutions that, coupled with the personal benefit test, 
may alleviate the issues faced by remote tippees and government regulators. 
1.  Entire Fairness:  A Rule Prohibiting Trading 
on Any and All Material Nonpublic Information 
Under a fairness rule, a remote tippee would be barred from trading on 
material nonpublic information at any time.  This rule would be the simplest 
for courts and regulators to implement and for remote tippees to follow.244  
This approach would still require a remote tippee to investigate whether the 
information in question is material and nonpublic, which is not always 
clear.245  However, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the entire 
fairness approach as being inconsistent with legislative intent.246  Thus, 
Congress would need to enact legislation explicitly banning trading on 
material nonpublic information, but, as noted by both Congress and the 
Supreme Court, such a statute may hamper the role performed by many 
market professionals.247 
2.  A Restrictive Reading of Dirks 
Under a narrow reading of Dirks, a remote tippee would incur liability 
only where she knows that she is the intended beneficiary.248  This 
approach would likely alleviate some of the issues faced in proving 
knowledge because, as the intended beneficiary, the remote tippee would 
likely know (or reasonably should know) that the information was disclosed 
to benefit her specifically.  Such a rule would also limit liability for the 
 
 243. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 233 n.16 (1980). 
 244. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224–25. 
 245. See id. at 233. 
 246. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657 n.16; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16. 
 247. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16. 
 248. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10. 
2796 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
tipper, who otherwise may be held liable for trades carried out by 
intermediary members of the tipping chain or subsequent remote tippees.249  
This reading of Dirks would permit intermediary tippees to tip other 
investors without incurring any liability,250 and there is little reason to 
condone such trades that were similarly facilitated by the same improper 
disclosure.251 
3.  The Chain Approach 
The chain approach is a slightly narrower version of the personal benefit 
test that would impose liability on remote tippees without the original 
tipper’s intention or expectation to benefit from a tippee’s trades.252  Under 
the chain approach, each tippee is treated as owing a duty of trust and 
confidence to the source of the information, thus creating “a chain of 
persons with a duty to disclose.”253  Under this approach, each member of 
the chain would be deemed to owe a fiduciary duty to the source of the 
information, and liability would exist 
so long as it could be shown that each person in the chain (1) was given 
the information expressly for the purpose of facilitating trading based on 
inside information, (2) knew that the information was material and 
[nonpublic], and (3) knew or had reason to know that it came to him as a 
result of some breach of duty by an insider.254 
While the chain approach focuses on the circumstances surrounding the tip 
to the remote tippee, it nonetheless requires that the original tipper breach a 
fiduciary duty for any of the subsequent members of the chain to incur 
liability.255  Additionally, the chain approach would permit investors who 
know that information was improperly disclosed to lawfully trade merely 
because they were not affirmatively brought into the tipping scheme.256  
This result would not serve any important policy interests nor justify a 
modification in the current substantive law. 
4.  The Personal Benefit Test 
Similar to the chain approach, the personal benefit test, established by the 
Supreme Court in Dirks,257 imposes liability on a remote tippee who trades 
on material nonpublic information that she knows was disclosed in 
exchange for a personal benefit.258  The personal benefit test best identifies 
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situations where insiders abuse their positions within the company for 
personal gain, which was the primary purpose of the SEC’s original 
disclose or abstain rule.259 
One interesting aspect of the personal benefit test is that success on the 
merits of an insider trading claim against a remote tippee depends on 
circumstances entirely outside of either party’s control.  For the unknowing 
investor, it does not matter whether the insider received a personal benefit 
for disclosing the material nonpublic information; the resulting harm from 
the remote tippee’s trading is the same.260  Whether the tip was disclosed in 
exchange for a personal benefit is entirely coincidental to the uninformed 
investor’s decision to trade.261  That this distinction is insignificant to the 
uninformed investor yet essential to determining a remote tippee’s liability 
exacerbates the need for investors to know whether or not a particular tip 
was improperly disclosed at the time the investor acts on the information.  
Thus, the major problem with the personal benefit test is that investors may 
find it difficult to immediately comply with the law at the time they receive 
material nonpublic information if they do not know all the relevant 
information surrounding the initial disclosure.  Solving this problem does 
not require a change in the substantive law.  Rather, the solution lies in 
providing investors with all pertinent information to allow them to take 
advantage of a tip’s time-sensitive value where trading is lawful. 
5.  A “Trading Relative or Friend” List 
One tool that could aid investors in determining whether they may trade 
on a particular tip is an exhaustive list of circumstances where the inference 
of a personal benefit may be drawn.  If Congress or the SEC set forth a list 
of relationships that satisfy the “trading relative or friend” standard, then the 
only issues for remote tippees and courts to discern would be the 
relationship between the tipper and primary tippee and whether that 
relationship is classified under the list.262  However, the obvious problem 
with exhaustively defining every possible circumstance under which a 
remote tippee should infer a personal benefit to the insider is the potential 
for abuse:  a creative trader could simply craft a scheme that does not 
involve a proscribed relationship.  Additionally, even if a governing body—
whether it be Congress, the SEC, or the courts—is able to clearly and 
definitively define what constitutes a “trading relative or friend,” the 
question of whether the remote tippee had, or should have had, knowledge 
of the insider’s breach will always be a factual issue—one that will be more 
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difficult to prove the further the remote tippee is from the insider.263  
Without that information, an investor would still be unable to determine 
whether trading is lawful.  Thus, enacting an exhaustive list of proscribed 
relationships would not sufficiently resolve the issues faced by investors. 
6.  Rule 10b5-D, a Safe Harbor Disclosure Rule 
Another mechanism that could alleviate the uncertainty faced by 
investors presented with material nonpublic information would be the 
adoption of a safe harbor disclosure rule, Rule 10b5-D.  Consider the hedge 
fund manager from the introduction:  under Rule 10b5-D, the manager 
would be permitted to trade on the analyst’s tip upon receipt of the 
information so long as she files a preliminary report with the SEC within 
two days of trading.  In the preliminary report, the manager would be 
required to provide a detailed account of all material facts pertaining to the 
trade known to the investor at that time, including the details of the tip, the 
number of shares purchased or sold, the amount at which the shares were 
purchased or sold, and any other facts regarding the source of the 
information.  The investor would then be required to conduct a reasonable 
investigation to determine whether the information was disclosed in breach 
of a fiduciary duty.  Subsequently, the manager would be required to file a 
report within a reasonable time period disclosing the results of the 
investigation.264  If the investigation reasonably indicates that no breach 
occurred, no further action would be taken.  If, however, the investor learns 
that the information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, she would 
be required to disgorge to the principal an amount equal to the profit gained 
or loss avoided.  By obtaining the preliminary and investigative reports, the 
SEC would have oversight over the entire process, where it could determine 
whether there are any discrepancies between the two reports and whether a 
further SEC investigation is warranted.  If the SEC were to find that either 
of the reports misrepresented material information, the investor may incur 
additional liability.  This approach would retain the advantages of the 
personal benefit test, promote disclosure to the SEC, and alleviate the issues 
presented in situations involving remote tippees. 
III.  ENACTING RULE 10b5-D WILL BEST 
ALLEVIATE CONCERNS 
UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The personal benefit test properly imposes liability on remote tippees 
where material nonpublic information is improperly disclosed.  However, 
remote tippees cannot always be expected to know whether disclosure was 
improper at the time they receive a tip, and the speed at which securities are 
traded today makes preemptive investigation costly and practically 
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impossible.265  Thus, while the substance of the personal benefit test is 
sound, compliance is arduous in practice. 
Implementing a safe harbor disclosure rule is the most effective way to 
promote prompt, informed decision making without modifying substantive 
law.  Where a remote tippee cannot reasonably know whether material 
nonpublic information was conveyed for a personal benefit, Rule 10b5-D 
would permit her to act quickly to realize the full value of the information.  
The safe harbor period would provide the investor time to investigate 
whether the information was the product of improper disclosure.  Because 
the investor would not be permitted to retain any profits if her investigation, 
or a subsequent SEC investigation, revealed that the information was 
disclosed in breach of a duty of trust and confidence, Rule 10b5-D would 
not permit the investor to profit from any informational advantage. 
Rule 10b5-D provides numerous benefits to various interested parties.  
First, investors will benefit from the ability to make timely investment 
decisions without the risk of incurring liability.  Because investment 
information is time sensitive,266 investors will be permitted to act decisively 
to realize the maximum possible value of a particular tip.  By allowing 
investors to perform the investigation after the trade has been made, 
investors need not forgo time-sensitive profits by performing a potentially 
lengthy investigation so long as they notify the SEC within two days of 
placing the trade.  If the investor later learns that the information was 
obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty, then disgorgement will put the 
investor back where she was before the trade, thereby depriving her of any 
informational advantage gained by her access to improperly gained material 
nonpublic information.  Thus, investors would be permitted to make lawful 
trades free from the risk of criminal prosecution without the possibility of 
retaining illicit profits. 
Additionally, investors presented with questionable tips will be 
incentivized to use the safe harbor in exchange for immunity from potential 
legal recourse.  While the odds of being caught for insider trading are 
low,267 the penalties are high.268  Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that at 
least some investors will be incentivized to use the safe harbor disclosure 
rule to avoid regulatory action and criminal prosecution even if that means 
disgorging profits that they might have gotten away with otherwise. 
A remote tippee’s incentive to utilize Rule 10b5-D is strengthened by an 
inherent desire to avoid uncertainty in the courtroom.  Because lower courts 
tend to implicitly impose a fairness-based rule contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent of Dirks, remote tippees could be found guilty of securities fraud 
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absent any breach of fiduciary duty.269  Rule 10b5-D would protect 
investors from these deviations and better ensure the results that the 
personal benefit test is intended to produce. 
Further, Rule 10b5-D will serve the interests of corporations, which will 
benefit from acquiring funds disgorged by investors where an investigation 
reveals that information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty.  
Corporations have an interest in their confidential information.270  This 
theory is consistent with the theory that insider trading harms a corporation 
because it constitutes an abuse of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation’s 
shareholders.271  Assuming the profits are disgorged to the corporation, the 
corporation may reinvest those funds in ways that may lead to an increase 
in that corporation’s stock price, which would ultimately benefit the 
shareholders.  Thus, requiring investors to disgorge improperly obtained 
profits to the corporation protects the corporation’s property interest in its 
information, and recognizing a corporation’s assignable property interest in 
its material nonpublic information is consistent with the original theory of 
insider trading. 
Rule 10b5-D will also benefit the SEC in several ways.  Because the 
investor performs the initial investigation, the SEC would externalize some 
of its investigative expenses and receive information to which it would not 
otherwise have access.  This would, appropriately, place the burden on 
investors because they will likely receive the greatest benefit from the rule.  
The additional disclosure would also allow the SEC to police stock markets 
more efficiently, as the information provided by remote tippees may help 
the SEC better identify tipping chains serving as a conduit for improperly 
disclosed material nonpublic information.  This will ultimately help the 
SEC to better identify specific individuals within those schemes, which may 
increase the prohibition’s deterrent effect and stifle the flow of improperly 
disclosed material nonpublic information. 
Additionally, adopting Rule 10b5-D would be consistent with the SEC’s 
role as a regulatory agency.  The political motivations for the insider trading 
prohibitions have been evident since the Exchange Act was enacted, as 
evidenced by the Pecora hearings.272  Since then, the SEC has adopted rules 
that effectively make claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 easier to 
sustain.273  By adopting Rule 10b5-D, the SEC would assume a more 
neutral position, in accordance with its regulatory mandate, without 
condoning insider trading.  Indeed, enacting Rule 10b5-D would be 
consistent with the express intent of both Congress and the Supreme 
Court.274 
Rule 10b5-D would also preserve the integrity of the market.  Absent any 
breach of fiduciary duty, the corporation does not suffer a legally 
 
 269. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
2017] REMOTE TIPPEES POST-SALMAN 2801 
cognizable harm, and the market may benefit from exposure to material 
nonpublic information before the corporation makes full disclosure.275  
However, where a tip is found to have been improperly disclosed, the 
integrity of the marketplace would remain intact because disgorgement 
protects the corporation’s interest in its information and ensures the 
informed investor does not realize any advantage from improper 
disclosure.276 
Rule 10b5-D would not be susceptible to abuse.  Any attempt to deceive 
the SEC with inaccurate preliminary or investigative reports could result in 
additional liability under the federal securities laws.  If the investor’s 
investigation is either unreasonable or deceptive (e.g., the investigative 
report concludes that the information was not obtained in breach of a 
fiduciary duty, but a breach in fact occurred and the reporting party had 
reason to know about it), then the investor could later incur double liability; 
she may be held liable as a remote tippee under Dirks for the original trade, 
and she may also be held liable for a separate count of securities fraud for 
filing a fraudulent investigative report.  This separate count of liability 
relies on the assumption that the fraudulent investigative report constitutes 
“a fraudulent or manipulative device in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security” under section 10(b).277  Additionally, the ability to perform a 
lengthy investigation after trading diminishes a remote tippee’s ability to 
plead ignorance with regard to whether a breach occurred.278 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Salman, there remains a 
number of lingering uncertainties concerning the practical implications of 
remote tippee treatment under the federal securities laws.  Where an 
investor lacks sufficient facts to determine whether material nonpublic 
information was improperly disclosed, fear of incurring liability for insider 
trading might prevent her from making a lawful trade.  Time spent 
investigating the requisite facts is costly, and the law should not deter or 
prevent legally permissible conduct.  Where trading on material nonpublic 
information is not prohibited under Dirks, investors should not have to 
forgo lawful profits, because they are uncertain of facts that are beyond 
their knowledge or control yet pivotal in their futures.  Thus, the SEC 
should enact Rule 10b5-D to alleviate these concerns because it will 
promote prompt, informed decision making without permitting the 
exploitation of a corporation’s confidential information. 
Under Rule 10b5-D, investors will be able to better make investment 
decisions in compliance with the law without the risk of incurring liability 
as a remote tippee.  By performing an investigation after trading, investors 
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will be able to realize the full value of a particular tip that they would 
otherwise be lawfully permitted to make if they knew that the information 
was not attributable to a breach of a relationship of trust and confidence.  In 
the event that the investor later learns that the information was improperly 
disclosed, disgorgement will prevent the investor from retaining any illicit 
profits.  The SEC’s oversight of the investor’s investigation will prevent the 
safe harbor from being abused, and the SEC will benefit by acquiring more 
information that it can use to identify other tipping chains and schemes that 
may otherwise go undetected.  Finally, corporations that are found to have 
been harmed by disloyal fiduciaries will benefit from receiving unlawfully 
obtained profits through disgorgement. 
Of course, this Note cannot predict how often this dilemma may arise or 
in how many situations Rule 10b5-D would be beneficial.  This would 
present a pressing concern if Rule 10b5-D were subject to misuse.  
However, the potential for additional liability will likely serve as a 
sufficient deterrent against misusing the safe harbor, especially since filing 
the preliminary and investigative reports under Rule 10b5-D would only 
shine a spotlight on investors who might have otherwise gone undetected.  
Moreover, the potential benefits that Rule 10b5-D could bestow upon 
investors, corporations, the SEC, and the market in general are compelling 
enough to justify its adoption. 
 
